




















Scholars are increasingly drawing on models and theories from the field of criminology to 
offer new insights on terrorist violence. A particularly useful framework by LaFree, Dugan 
and Korte works from the assumption that illegal behaviour can be affected by the threat 
and/or imposition of punishment. It sees the results of the government’s intervention in terms 
of deterrence (state’s repressive action leads to a reduction in terrorism violence) and 
backlash (state’s repressive action leads to defiance and retaliation and an upsurge of 
terrorism violence). This article applies this model to a case study of the government’s 
responses to Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). It uses a variation of survival analysis technique 
-Series Hazard- to assess the impact of six major initiatives on the risk of new ETA attacks in 
the period from 1977 to 2010. Mostly, the results provide support for both backlash 




The study of terrorism, traditionally dominated by approaches from political science and 
psychology, is becoming increasingly informed by insights emerging from the field of 
criminology. After a slow start, theories and methods that have been employed for years in 
the study of ‘normal’ crime are now being applied to terrorism data. These criminological 
approaches offer new insights on a variety of aspects, including the funding tools for 
clandestine activity, the relationship between organised crime and political violence, target-
hardening strategies against terrorist attacks or the evaluation of the effectiveness of counter-
terror strategies.  
Precisely in relation to the latter dimension, a 2009 article by LaFree, Dugan and Korte made 
a number of important methodological and theoretical contributions.
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 The study examined the 
impact of six specific British counterterror strategies on Republican violence over a 23-year 
period, using an extension of the Cox Hazard model to determine the effect of these measures 
on the duration between attacks. LaFree et al. had already utilised this statistical approach in 
a 2005 paper on airline hijackings,
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 but this more recent study highlighted the effective 
application of two concepts with a long pedigree in criminology: deterrence and backlash.           
The principle that the threat and imposition of punishment deters crime is, of course, at the 
centre of criminal law. The fundamental assumptionhere is that individuals are rational actors 
that would try to maximise their personal gain while minimising costs and would alter their 
behaviour based on cost-benefit calculations. Therefore a higher chance of apprehension or a 
harsher punishment from the state would therefore discourage more people from breaking the 
law.  
This perspective has dominated western counter-terror responses, as illustrated by the 
frequency in which the emergence of sub-national violence is immediately confronted with 
new laws with harsher penalties for serious crimes and longer prison sentences when they are 
committed by members of terrorist organisations. The traditional response not only relies on 
raising the threshold of punishment but also to make the threat of punishment more credible 
by giving new powers and more resources to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
Decision makers and legislators expect these measures to prevent and deter future acts of 
violence.          
At the same time, criminological research has also demonstrated that repressive measures 
may in fact fail
3
and,in some cases, even have the opposite effect, say, an increase of the illicit 
behaviour or a ‘backlash’. This finding is particularly relevant for the study of terrorism, 
where it has been suggested that greater state repression can exacerbate political violence 
because of the grievances it generates.A theme that regularly emerges in the terrorism studies 
literature on why terrorism declines or ends
4
is that hard-line policies do not always succeed 
and can even backfire.  
The rationale is that increased government repression may motivate violent actors to retaliate. 
Further, when a coercive government response is widely believed to be illegitimate and/or 
disproportionateby the community from which the group originates,then this may elicit acts 
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of defiance and additional outpouring of support for the group. In practice this may get 
translated into successful recruitment drives and/or an increased likelihood that supporters 
and sympathisers will financially sponsor or operationally assist the organisation. At the same 
time, draconian internal security measures run the risk of undermining support for the 
government’s counterterrorist efforts amongst the wider population. In sum, by provoking the 
authorities to resort to excessive repression, these militant groups can portray themselves as 
protectors of the population and, in the process, erode popular support for the government.      
These two notions of deterrence and backlash are clearly operationalised byLaFreeet al. The 
authorsconsider that ‘a significant decrease in the hazard of new strikes after a major 
government counterterrorist intervention is consistent with a deterrence effect, and that a 
significant increase is consistent with a backlash effect. A null effect suggests that either no 
relationship exists or that deterrence and backlash dynamics have neutralized each other’.5 
LaFree et al. concludedtheir article by advocating for the application of this deterrence-
backlash framework to other existing political conflicts. Thus, this study answers this call by 
examining a list of counterterror interventions
6
 adopted in the fight against Euzkadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist organisation. It applies the conceptual and 
methodological approach developed by LaFreeet al. to the ETA case study to test the 
generalisability of their conclusions and contribute to a process of theory development.    
For us, ETA is a natural comparison case for the LaFree et al. Irish Republican Army-based 
analysis. Although oft-overlooked fundamental differences exist between the political 
conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, ETA and the IRA do share similarities:  
First, they are both ethno-nationalist groups that grew in the 1970s wave of radical nationalist 
violence. Second, both have had long histories of armed struggle: The Provisional IRA was 
active from 1969 until 1998 whereas ETA was founded in 1959 and, at the time of writing, 
still exists. These parallels allow us to explore whether LaFreeet al.’sfindings remain relevant 
when examining government responses to other militant groups that pursue similar nationalist 
political goals through protracted campaigns of violence.   
We have identified in our analysis six counter-terrorist interventions used by both the Spanish 
and the French governments to confront ETA violence in the period 1977 to 2011. The goal 
was not necessarily to test interventions that could be hypothesised in advance to have 
effectively combated ETA but to measure the impact of high-profile initiatives for which 
substantial coverage existed in the media and academic literature and whose modelling could 
lead to rich insights on the interplay between deterrence and backlash effects.   
Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Spanish Ministry of the 
Interior, we ended up with a dataset containing 1,713 incidents for the period. We then 
applied Series Hazardmethods (an extension of Cox proportional hazard model) to the data to 
determine whether the risk of attacks was significantly affected after the interventions were 
implemented. In the model we controlled for the impact of political factors and other 
statistical effects. A significant decrease in the hazard of future incidents of violence is seen 
4 
 
as evidence of a deterrence effect, while anincrease in the hazard of future incidents of 
violence is interpreted as evidence of a backlash effect.          
Before presenting our findings, we provide first an overview of relevant literature. We then 
summarise the evolution of this militant group and describe those state responses that have 
been considered in the study. We then proceed to review the model and variables and present 
the results. We discuss them in the last section, explain their relevance and suggest further 
avenues of research.        
 
Literature Review  
For the sake of brevity, we focus on examining those works that specifically look at Spanish 
counter-terror strategies against ETA terrorism, where one soon realises that the majority of 
studies are qualitative.Only a handful of evaluations of the effectiveness of counter-terror 
policies against ETA rely on formal statistical tests. Nevin, for instance,uses Spanish policies 
against ETA from 1973 to 1983 as one out of seven case studies of government counterterror 
strategies.  Nevin’s article focuseson whether retaliation reduces or increases terrorism and, 
in answering it through lagged time series models, findsthat, for the particular case of ETA, 
government retaliation led to increased terrorist action, a finding that contradicts deterrence 
models. 
7
However, Nevin does not distinguish or test separately for the effects of specific 
counterterror tactics when he discusses retaliation, a broad concept that incorporates without 
distinction a wide variety of potential government responses, from arrests through targeted 
killings to large-scale military attacks.   
A 2003 article by Barros aims at evaluating the influence of a series of factors on ETA 
violence using as method a vector autoregression time series framework.
8As in Nevin’s 
study, the model does not include individual counterterror interventions as variables.Barros 
finds that deterrence effects and economic variables do not exert any significantinfluence 
while political effects seem to provoke more terrorist incidents. Based on this, it is predicted 
that the banning of Batasuna, an intervention that is also assessed in this article, would likely 
lead to more terrorism. The study relies on annual data and, as we later discuss, Dugan and 
others have highlighted the important advantages that survival analyses have over time series 




Hence, Barros, in collaboration with Passos and Gil-Alana, used duration models as an 
alternative in a 2006 paper. They employ a series of parametric and semi-parametric hazard 
models to examine the impact of a number of factors on the length of time between ETA 
terrorist attacks. Their conclusion is that ‘ETA attacks increase in summer and decrease with 
deterrence, repressive political governments, succedaneum terrorist activities, murders and 
political accords’.10An issue with this study is their use of ITERATE data since, as discussed 
in the methodology section, this source contains only transnational attacks whereas ETA 





There are two studies that come closer to the analytical framework adopted here. Gil-Alana 
and Barros look at proactive and reactive deterrence policies in fighting ETA terrorism in a 
2010 article and, in a conference paper of the same year
12
, Chenoweth and Perkoski apply a 
Cox Hazard model to ETA data.
13
 The latter do so for the period 1988-1992 to argue that 
discriminate restrictive policies (i.e. arrests) are the most robust reducers of terrorist activity 
out of the menu of options available to the government.Differences between Chenoweth and 
Perkoski’s paperand this study include the length of the period under investigation (we 
extend the period further than 5 years), the fact we are selecting specific strategic 
interventions instead of their choice of categories of tactical action (i.e. Condemnations, 
arrests, deportations and others) and our adoption of a deterrence/backlash conceptual model 
to interpret the results.  
On the other hand, Gil-Alana and Barros’ paper assesses the effectiveness in the fight against 
ETA of Spanish proactive and defensive deterrence policies, which are broken down further 
into political and retaliatory initiatives. The article’s main argument is that political proactive 
measures are effective in reducing ETA activity whereas,in most cases, proactive retaliatory 
policies are not. We have included as variables in our model some of the initiatives they test 
but also introduce others based on their visibility and importance within the existing literature 
on Spanish counter-terrorism.
14
Apart from divergences in the selections of variables, unit of 
analysis (killings instead of incidents) and data sources, Gil-Alana and Barros did use a 
different statistical method (Poisson count models) from the one implemented here.    
In sum, evidence for the impact of Spanish antiterrorist strategies is varied, with some studies 
showing support for deterrence measures and others presenting mixed evidence or no 
significant effects.   
 
The ETA Case Study 
Before we describe our own approach, we provide a concise overview of the case study. In 
the process we will highlight the specific developments that we include as primary and 
control variables in the model.They appear in bold and will be later described in detail in the 
methodology section(see also Table 1 and 2 for the full list of variables in the model).  
ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna- Basque Homeland and Freedom) is the largest remaining 
ethno-nationalist terrorist organisation in Europe. Founded in 1959 during the Franco 
dictatorship as a splinter group of the youth group of the historic PNV (PartidoNacionalista 




ETA’s first attack took place in 1961 with an attempt toderail a train carrying civil war 
veterans travelling to San Sebastián. The organisation did not claim its first victim until 1968 
and during most of Franco’s dictatorship only engaged in sporadic acts of violence.In fact, it 





During the transition from authoritarian rule there was a dramatic upsurge in their 
violenceand the 1978-1980 period was the bloodiest in ETA’s history.   
Throughout 1977 and early 1978 the strategy of the first democratic government to tackle the 
high levels of political violence in the country
17
 was to progressively liberalise the regime, as 
represented by the granting in October 1977 of a general amnesty to all political prisoners. 
However, the hopes by the Spanish political elites that ETA’s political violence would recede 
with progress towards democracy were soon dashed: the number of terrorist incidents 
continued growing fast and so did the pressure for a more repressive response to ETA’s 
actions.  
The turning point towards a harsher Spanish Antiterrorist policy -and the first intervention 
examined in this study- is the 1 July entry into force of Law 21/1978, which gave the police 
new powers of arrest and detention.  As Clark describes: ‘Suspects could be held without 
charges filed against them for more than seventy-two hours [..] Police were also granted the 
right to intercept mail and telephone messages received by suspected terrorists. [..] Amnesty 
and pardons for terrorist crimes were also ruled out and courts were not allowed to release 
prisoners on bond before trial’. 18 The Law remained Spain’s basic antiterrorist law for about 
eighteen months.
19
 Importantly, Alonso and Reinares have described how these provisions 
were intended to support police’s work but, because they were enforced by security agencies 
that were still unreformed and lacking the ethos and professional culture appropriate for a 
democratic society, the legislation resulted in cases of mistreatment and torture. 
20
 
In parallel with a more coercive security approach, in 1979 the approval by referendum of the 
Estatuto de Autonomíadel País Vasco (Basque Autonomy Statute) -also known as the 
Guernica Statute- led during the 1980s to the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) 
gradually achieving significant levels of self-government. These included a Basque 
Parliament and regional government, its own police force (the Ertzaintza), independent fiscal, 
educational and health systems and a public television and radio stations 
(EuskalIrratiTelebista-EITB) broadcasting in the Basque language (Euskera). Despite these 
evident signs of progress, ETA violence persisted unabated during the whole period.  
The 1982 Socialist government deepened the trend towards more coercive and stringent 
counter-terror policies. By far the most controversial element of this response is the 
establishment of a clandestine paramilitary group to assassinate ETA members and 
sympathisers in Southern France. The GruposAntiterroristas de Liberación(Antiterrorist 
Liberation Groups), better known by their acronym GAL, were a state sponsored group 
consisting of members of the state security forces, right-wing extremists and foreign 
mercenaries who killed 27 people -many of whom turned out to have no relationship 
whatsoever with ETA- during the 1983-1987 period.
21
The two main reasons behind the 
establishment of this group were: a) to operatein the French Basque Country, which had acted 
as a safe haven for ETA members over the years, a place to train, recruit, plan operations, 
indoctrinate and to escape from the Spanish forces’ pressure; and b) to put pressure on the 
French government to end ETA’s use of their territory. 
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Obviously, this example of state terrorism was a secret operation and never a formal 
government policy but responsibility for its planning, organisation and funding came from 
the highest echelon of the state’s security decision-makers: amongst others, the then 
Secretary of State for Security and Minister of the Interior were eventually charged, 
prosecuted and imprisoned for setting up the group. This aspect of the dirty war, a notorious 
chapter in the Spanish state’s fight against ETA, is therefore considered as a state 
intervention in the context of this study. 
Persistent lobbying by the Spanish government and French concerns over the spill-over of the 
Basque violence into their own territory eventually led to a change of policy. Frenchpolicies 
vis-à-vis ETA significantly toughened, firstly by deporting their members to other countries 
and, eventually and, starting from 1984, by extraditing them directly to Spain. The short and 
long-term effects from the introduction of these measures are also measured in the model.     
Since the mid-1980s, there has been an ever increasing degree of cooperation between these 
two countries. In fact, experts and practitioners have traditionally considered French support 
as fundamental in combating ETA violence. Hence, the first major police operation resulting 
from enhanced French-Spanish cooperation constitutes the fourth intervention in the model. 
On November 5, 1986, acting from information passed by the Spanish ministry of interior, a 
raid by the French security forces at the Sokoa furniture plant in Hendaye, a town in the 
French Basque Country, led to the retrieval of a large arsenal of ETA weapons and explosives 
and the arrest of 11 members and collaborators. In addition, a massive cache of documents 
containing information on the organisation’s finances were seized.    
A year later, in January 1988, all the major Basque political forces, with the exception of 
ETA’s political armHerriBatasuna (Unity of The People), signed the agreement known as the 
Pact of Ajuria-Enea. Signatories agreed on the necessity of the eradication of terrorism from 
Basque Country and the illegitimacy of violence as tool to achieve political change. 
Meanwhile, a root-and-branch reform of the security services continued purging surviving 
Francoist elements, leading to more targeted, consistent and discriminate counter-terror 
practices that were more respectful of the individual rights. The overall number of arrests 
diminished but the proportion of those who resulted in prosecutions increased and cases of 
police brutality and ill-treatment were greatly reduced. Their use as a systematic practice 
became progressively eradicated during the 1990s.
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Although the first official negotiations –and accompanying ceasefire- between 
representatives of ETA and the Spanish government conducted in 1989 in Algiers ended in 
failure, French-Spanish collaborationgrew closer and continued yielding results. A key 
security breakthrough was the fall of the entire ETA leadership in a police operation in 
Bidart (Southern France) in March 1992. Using intelligence provided by the Guardia Civil, 
the French police arrested in a single swoop ETA’s complete executive committee.23 This 
intervention, the fifth in our model, is seen as having forced ETA to reconfigure their 
management structures, rebuild parts of the organisation, and strengthen the security 
measures of their militants.  
8 
 
It also led to a process of internal reflection and an eventual strategic shift in 1995. Then, as 
Sánchez-Cuenca details: ‘a new emphasis was added on the necessity of achieving 
independence not in direct negotiations with the state, but rather through an agreement with 
all nationalist forces in the [BAC]’.24 
This entailed two aspects. Firstly, a change in the target selection, as non-nationalist 
politicians, academics, journalists, intellectuals and other groups in society became priority 
targets.
25
 The goal was to ‘Ulsterise’ the region, that is, to create two divided communities 
within Basque society (nationalists and non-nationalists) where moderate nationalists would 
be forced to join ETA’s side. 
To further this strategy of extending violent action into wider sectors of Basque society, 
Jarrai, the youth wing of the Movimiento de LiberaciónNacional Vasco(MLNV), the dense 
network of institutions that surrounded ETA, became engaged in the so-called Kale 
Borroka(street fighting) campaign.  These were acts of street hooliganism, described as ‘low 
intensity terrorism’ that often took the form of harassment and death threats to non-nationalist 
public figures and/or local councillors.
26
 As a result of these, and coupled with ETA’s 
killings, hundreds of individuals were forced to leave Basque Country or be assigned 
bodyguards for their protection.            
The second element in the strategy was to form a nationalist political front. Under the 
promise of an eventual end to the armed struggle, ETA political representatives signed on 
September 12, 1998, together with all other major nationalist parties, the so-called Lizarra 
Pact. In exchange for ETA renouncing violence, these political parties agreed to fight for the 
independence of Basque Country, to renege from the AjuriaEnea Pact and to isolate non-
nationalist parties. Following the signature, ETA announced a truce in September 16, 1998 
that it broke again only a few months later on November 28, 1999. Seemingly, the 
organisation was disappointed with the ‘slow’ pace of the political process and the lack of 
results from the contacts maintained in places like Zurichwith the Spanish government 
during this period. ETA’s decision resulted in moderate nationalist parties breaking their 
links with the group and the eventual end of the Lizarra strategy.   
As a reaction, PSOE and PP, the two main Spanish political parties, signed on 8 December 
2000 an agreement,Acuerdoporlaslibertades y contra el terrorismo,that prevented the 
achievement of any political goal through terrorist violence. Most importantly, this accord 
brought about the political conditions that led to the passing in 2002 of the Ley de Partidos, a 
legislation that made political parties connected to a terrorist organization illegal. This is the 
mechanism that facilitated the very same year the banning of Batasuna, ETA’s electoral 
wing. This measure represents the last intervention included in the analysis.   
As a result of the failure of the 1995 strategic shift, ETAfound itself without direction and on 
March 22, 2006 announced a ‘permanent ceasefire’. The Socialist government agreed to 
initiate talks with independent mediators in Geneva and Oslothat failed to come to fruition. 
ETA abruptly breaks the impasse on December 30, 2006 with the explosion of a car bomb in 
Barajas airport in Madrid, which killed two people. After a series of murders, on January 10, 
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2011, ETA, devoid of broad popular support and suffering from a dramatically reduced 
capacity for action, declares a ‘permanent and internationally-verifiable ceasefire’. At the 




Similar to LaFree et al., our study is based on incident data collected from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD).
27
 The GTD is the most comprehensive source of data on 
terrorism across the globe and its clear coding techniques and overall reliability makes it one 
of the most utilised resources by scholars in the field.
28
 What separates GTD from other 
similar databases such as RAND-MIPT and ITERATE is that it includes both domestic and 
international terrorist incidents. This is particularly important for the ETA case study since 
the vast majority of their violent actions have been conducted either in Basque Country or 
other parts of Spain.
29
 
After a comprehensive cleaning of the data and complementing the GTD file with open 
source information from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior
30
 and evidence from Vidas 
Rotas, a compendium of victims assassinated by ETA
31
, ourfinal analysis file contained a 
total number of 1,713 ETA incidents. The dataset includes all recorded ETA attacks both 
inside and outside Spain. The geographical distribution of the incidents occurred within the 
country and the French departments that border Spain can be examined in a map at Appendix 
B. 
We consider the period from January 1, 1977, through January 10, 2011, as the span of time 
for our analysis.
32
 The end date coincides with ETA’s declaration of a ‘definitive cessation’ 
of armed activity. This occurs 8 years after the most recent initiative in this analysis is 
introduced–the banning of Batasuna, ETA’s political arm-. It is important to note that all 
interventions in the study have been conducted under democratically-elected governments.  
 
Methods  
As described in the introductory section, we follow the strategy set by LaFreeet al. in their 
use of a variation of Cox proportional hazard models to estimate the impact of the selected 
six counterterror interventions on the risk of future ETA attacks. Since the publication of this 
article, Dugan has convincingly demonstrated that Cox-type models work well for event data 
and referred to this variation as a Series Hazard Model. It offers a better alternative to time 
series when estimating the impact of multiple interventions mostly because it does not require 
the temporal aggregationof data and it is therefore more effective in capturing variation in the 





The outcome variable in a Series Hazard model is the time between attacks, and the units are 
terrorist attacks instead of subjects. Interventions enter in the model as dummy variables and 
the model can be adjusted by other control variables measured at the time of eachattack. 
Similarto LaFreeet al., when more than one incident in the dataset are part of a coordinated 
act of violence, then cases have been converted to represent these multiple-part events as a 
single attack. The mean number of days between attacks was 7.18 days. The distribution is 




 percentile respectively. 
In practical terms, this means that the equation used for the analysis is: 
𝜆𝑘(𝑡|𝑋𝑘) =  𝜆0exp (𝛽𝑖𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑘 + 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑘) 
Wherek represents each terrorist attack, 𝛽𝑖represents the coefficients for the interventions and 
𝛾𝑗are the coefficients for the variables used as controls. To measure the impact of the 
interventions, we used a series of dummyvariables with values of “1” for attacks that were 
perpetrated during theperiod relevant to the intervention and “0” otherwise.The hazard of a 
new attack is associated to  baseline hazard function with unspecified distribution and other 
risk or protective factors measured at the time of the current attack represented by the vectors 
‘Government Interventions’ for the punitive initiatives against ETA and ‘Controls’ for the 
control variables.  
The variables used in the analysis are listed in the following table.
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HERE TABLE 1  
 
Government Interventions  
The present study includes six state interventions. Fourof these interventions occurred during 
the 1980s, a period when Spanish counter-terror policies are in flux, witha wide range of 
different initiatives being performed. Some will become permanent elements of the counter-
terror response, others will have fleeting existence.It is by the end of the 1980s when the 
state’s counter-terror apparatus consolidates.   
Thus, our first criminal justice intervention is the introduction of the Law/21 1978, which 
took effect on July 1, 1978. It was phased out when the Spanish Congress of Deputies 
approved on October 29, 1980 the Organic Law on Citizen Security, which codified and 
replaced the provisions of the preceding anti-terrorist laws. Therefore the legal intervention 
was coded as “1” from July 1, 1978 to October 29, 1980. 
The other major example in the model of Spanish legislative action, the banning of Batasuna, 
has a less precise starting date. It is on June 4, 2002 when the Organic Law 6/2002 (Ley de 
PartidosPolíticos) is passed by the Spanish Parliament and 27 June when it comes into force. 
This legislation would allow the PP and PSOE to start on August 13 the process resulting in 
the illegalisation of Batasuna, ETA’s political arm, carried out by requesting the state’s 
Prosecution Office to initiate legal action. However, we have adopted August 26 as the 
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starting date for the intervention period because this is precisely when the Spanish judge 
BaltasarGarzóninitiates the legal proceedings to suspend Batasuna’s political activities.35 
The most controversial of this list of state interventions were the activities of GAL, whose 
period of action runs from the date of their first murders in October 17, 1983
36
 toJuly, 24 
1987.
37
The two police operations included in the model, Sokoa and Bidart, have clear starting 
dates: the French police raid at Sokoa was conducted on November 5, 1986 and the arrest of 
ETA leaders in Bidart on March 29, 1992. Formally, they lasted one day. However both 
operations, products of French-Spanish counter-terror cooperation, resulted in important 
arrests and the collection of internal documents that represented a treasure trove of 
intelligence. Hence, they are considered as having eventually brought about further arrests 
and disruption of ETA’s operations. Therefore, it is difficult to precise a specific end date.  
Following LaFree et al.’s strategy, when these circumstances arise, weinitially set the end 
time for the events at 1 year. In the Bidart case, the period intervention finalised before the 
start of the next initiative, so there was no overlap. However, as we will see later, this was not 
always the case.  
At the same time, in case the 1-year cut-off proved too limiting, we explored other time 
windows for interventions and controls with a non-defined end. Thus, we programmed a set 
of models where the control variables were forced into the model and the interventions 
selected with a backward selection method, varying the period for those interventions without 
a clear end date. We then compared the models using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). A combination of the simulation analysis
38
 and the visual study of Figures 1 and 2 
suggested the use of one and three yearsperiods to assess the impact of those interventions. 
Once the final model was established, we also conducted sensitivity tests that vary the end 
dates with monthly increases to measure the impact in the estimates. Furthermore, to test for 
the possibility that hazard changed within the intervention period, we included an interaction 
term between each intervention and the cumulative month since the beginning of the study 
period.  
The third criminal justice procedure, the start of systematic deportations and extraditions of 
ETA members living in Southern France was of course conducted by the French government. 
These, however, would not have occurred without Spanish government’s insistence and 
lobbying efforts. Thus, although French-Spanish cooperation is formalised at the June 14, 
1984 Acuerdos de la Castellana, Spanish pressure had already begun to pay dividends by 
early 1984, where the major change in French policy was signalled by the immediate 
deportation of six arrested members of ETA, first to Guadeloupe and then to Panama.
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Here we face the same issues than with the two police interventions above: an indeterminate 
concluding date, since French extradition of alleged Etarras continues until this day. Hence, 
we have measured its effects in three ways: the short-term impact, one that ends in one year, 





Control Variables  
To control for the presence of alternative explanations, we have produced a list of relevant 
variables.  
First, negotiations: This variable refers to those formal negotiation processes established 
between the Spanish Government and ETA leaders as a result of, during, or leading to an 
ETA truce. Although the Spanish government and ETA have established channels of 
communication several times over the past four decades, including half a dozen attempts to 
negotiate a ceasefire between 1977 and 1980
40
, the three periods that are included in the 
variable did lead to sustained and formalised talks. These encompass three separate 
processes: the negotiations between ETA and the Gonzalez Socialist government during 14 
January–7 April 1989 in Algiers (‘Algiers’), the set of contacts between PartidoPopular’s 
Aznar government and ETA between November 3, 1998 and November 28, 1999 that 
included a formal meeting in Zurich (‘Zurich’) and the talks carried out under former 
Socialist leader’s Zapatero in Geneva and Oslo from June 25, 2005 to May 21, 2007 (‘Oslo’).  
Due to the reason explained above, the periods included in the control variable ceasefires 
tend to overlap with the negotiations variable. Although ETA has unilaterally interrupted 
their attacks for very brief periodsin a few occasions, we are including in the model the 
longest and most politically significant ETA ceasefires: 8 January – 4 April 1989, 16 
September – 28 November 1999 and 22 March 2006 – 30 December 2006. Due to the 
existing overlaps, we therefore decided to merge the negotiations and ceasefires periods in 
our model, using the earliest and latest dates to set the time boundaries of the three control 
variables (‘Algiers’, ‘Zurich’, ‘Oslo’).   
In addition, we have two political controls: Guernica Statute and Ajuria-Enea Pact. To allow 
sufficient time for the first results from the Statute to take place we resorted to a three year 
period and the effects of Ajuria-Enea are assumed to lasts until the signing of the 1998 
Lizarra Pact, which dissolves temporarily the political consensus on counterterrorism 
amongst Basque nationalist and non-nationalist parties thatAjuria-Enea built.         
We also included statistical controls suggested in LaFree et al. paper to explain the expected 
correlation between incidents: 
To control for the momentum of previous attacks, a measure of attack densityhas been added. 
This represents the number of days covered by the three most recent attacks, which includes 
the current attack.  We also explored the option of including the seven most recent attacks, as 
suggested by Dugan
41
, and autoregressive terms but the variability explained by the density 
variable based on three attacks was clearly larger than any other variable’s, and this was also 
supported by the AIC values measure when comparing models.
42
 
Additionally, Cumulative month is suggested in Dugan’s paper to adjust for trends. The 
median (Interquartile range) number of attacks occurred 113 (130) months into the series.We 
included interactions between this variable and each state intervention to assess whether the 
hazard ratio varies across the intervention.  
13 
 
To conclude our overview of the model, Figures 1 and 2 present the monthly number of 
attacks with all the interventions and controls imposed.      
HERE FIGURES 1 AND 2  
For the sake of clarity, we divide the research period into two separate phases tobetter display 
the evolution of ETA’s violence and the timing of the interventions. Most of our variables 
can be found in the first period and, almost inevitably due to their closeness in time, overlaps 
exist. This is especially the case for the GAL and French extraditions variables, where the 
former’s intervention period contains the latter’s in its entirety. As we will later explain, this 
entailed importantmodelling and methodological challenges.  
 
Hazard Model Results  
At first sight, the initial conclusion that can be adopted from the results of the analysis is the 
importance of statistical controls for this type of models. It should be noted that the variable 
attack density explains much of the variability in the model. Hence, the risk of new attacks 
seems to be substantially related to the periodicity of the previous three attacks. In other 
words, when the three most recent attacks occurred over a short period of time, the risk of 
another ETA attack taking place is high. The methodological implications are obvious as 
these results support LaFree et al’s decision to include this variable as a mechanism to reduce 
the bias caused by possible endogeneity between earlier attacks and the timing of 
interventions. It also demonstrates the importance of the selection of the right covariates to 
remove the dependence between attacks when interpreting Series Hazard models.     
The best fitted model (Table 2) included the 3-year impact of the commencement of the 
French deportation and extradition policy. French extradition policy has a positive 
coefficient: attacks increased in the three years following the French shift towards a harsher 
approach against alleged ETA militants living within their borders so a backlash effect may 
be assumed. The hazard of a new terrorist attack occurring increased between 8.4 and 48.8% 
compared to the rest of the study period. 
HERE TABLE 2  
In another model the French extraditions variable was incorporated as a one-year 
effect.Interestingly, this interventionleft the model and the GAL became a statistically 
significant backlash effect. As expected, there was amulticollinearityproblem between these 
two intervention variables: nowthe hazard ratio at the period of GAL operations was 
estimated between 0.7% and 36.7%. As can be seen in Figure 1, the backlash effect comes 
from the two peaks of attacks in the time span covered by these interventions.  
The multicollinearity observed between GAL and the French collaboration highlight one of 
the issues with the Series Hazard models: when two periods are largely overlapped, the 
model cannot differentiate the individual effects from each intervention. Since we cannot 
determine in which proportion the French extraditions were the reason for having an increase 
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in the number of attacks compared to GAL, we assume both interventions were important and 
focus on determining whether the general effect is backlash or deterrence. 
Whatever their differences -one is a programme of state terror, the other an initiative 
conducted under the rule of law- it is possible to perceive them as two facets of the same 
process: the growth in overt and covert repression exerted on ETA supporters in Southern 
France that undermined the reputation of the region as a terrorist sanctuary. We found in our 
analysis that part of the short-term backlash effect is explained in terms of the start of a 
campaign against French interests in Spain involving about 50 incidents, 16% of all the 
attacks carried out during the GAL intervention period.  
Since both strategies remained in place by January 2011, we also measured the effects of 
French extradition policy and the illegalisation of Batasunauntil the end of the study to 
examine whether there would be substantial changes in the hazard ratios if we modified the 
interventions’ end date. Since –unlike Batasuna- the French cooperation variable is 
statistically significant, we include the sensitivity analysis in Appendix C. The figure shows 
that the effects for the three-years and long-term periods are similar. 
We tested all interactions between the interventions and the month of the attack since the 
beginning of the study. We found that the interaction with the 1978 Antiterrorist Law was 
statistically significant (p-value 0.009), which means that there is an important increase of the 
hazard ratio (i.e. backlash) during the time-window of the intervention (from 8.6% to 97.2% 
by the end of the interval). Figure 1 shows howthese years do include the largest upsurge in 
attacks found in the distribution and constitutes ETA’s most active phase ever.   
Surprisingly, there is not a statistically significant reduction of the hazard rate after 
Bidart,despite the graph in Appendix A showing a decrease in the number of incidents during 
the intervention period. Bidartis usually described in the literature as a severe blow to ETA 
that considerably eroded their capacity to act. Furthermore, the loss of the entire ETA 
leadership is often seen as being the catalyst for a radical change of strategy and the opening 
of a new stage in ETA’s armed struggle.43 Appendix A seemed to support this view –a 
downward trend seems evident- but the model did not. We should highlight that these 
intervention periods included fairly low numbers of attacks and can lead to relatively large 
standard errors. This may mean that the model does not have enough statistical power to 
detect a small effect to compare to the underlying baseline. As Dugan states, for this model to 
work at its best, events must occur relatively frequently due to the fact that changes in 
temporal covariates are only measured during events. Since rare events can reduce statistical 
variation, the model is less likely to detect effects.
44
 
Overall, a decreasing trend in number and frequency of terrorist incidents is observed. We 
find that the hazard of subsequent attacks increased following the passing of the 1978 
Antiterrorist Law and the start of the French policy of deportations and extraditions and 
during the period of GAL activity. Three of the backlash effects are statistically significant 
(1978 Law, French extraditions and GAL). GAL and French extraditions presented a 





The evolution of ETA violence is a multidimensional phenomenon reactivenot only to state 
policies but also to socio-political considerations in the Basque Country, internal debates 
within ETA itself and developments in other parts of Europe. Yet if we take a cursory look at 
the time series charts, they show a rather straightforward pattern: rapid growth of ETA 
violence in the mid-1970s, a dramatic escalation that reaches a peak in the 1978-1980 period 
and then a long, irreversible decline. To explain this evolution, generally the literature 
focuses on the following: the state meeting Basque aspirations for greater political autonomy 
within the framework of the Spanish constitution, the growing rejection and increasingly 
public opposition of most Basques to ETA violence, enhanced effectiveness and 
proportionality of the Spanish security services action, and gradually improving international 
cooperation.
45
 All these contribute to a general negative tendency –for ETA- that becomes 
more noticeable over the years and is reflected in the model by the role of cumulative month 
as a control variable.
46
 Hence, although Bidart, when considered independently, appears to 
result in a clear reduction in the prevalence of attacks, the effects seem simply to add to the 
overwhelming inertia leading to ETAs decline, rather than strongly changing the trend.    
Regardless of the statistical significance of the impact from this widely-debated measure, the 
claims by critics that the banning of this political party would bring about new forms of 
grievances and more violence on the streets are clearly not evidenced in the data. It appears 
evident that the rejection of Batasuna members to this measure was more than 
counterbalanced by the dismantling of the sustained support that the party provided to the 
terrorist group. It also seems clear that these criticisms also failed to recognise the possibility 
that supporters of Basque independence would gravitate towards other political parties
47
 that 
were seeking the same political goal and, since they had no links with terrorist groups, were 
legal. This siphoning off support due to Batasuna’s inability to join Basque’s institutional 
politics strengthened those voices within the MLNV that were critical of the instrumental use 




Regarding those variables still significant even after controlling for endogeneity, we find two 
interesting initiatives: the 1978 Antiterrorist Law and the 1984 French policy of deportations 
and extraditions. Both of them support backlash interpretations. This may come as a surprise 
to those who consider French-Spanish cooperation crucial to explain the extreme weakness of 
ETA’s military apparatus today. We hasten to add that our results do not reject this claim, 
what they show is that, in the immediate short term, this measure led to a retaliatory response 
by ETA. This can be easily confirmed by examining the description of the incidents covered 
in the dataset, which show a growth in attacks against French commercial interests (i.e. 
automakers, supermarkets, banks and more) in Spain after 1984. As we established earlier, 
French-Spanish security cooperation is one of the main factors that are used by experts to 
explain the long-term general downward trajectory of ETA violence, yet the data seem to 
demonstrate that the immediate benefits gained were offset short-term by a spike of attacks in 
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revenge of the French volte-face. We believe this to be an important finding as it warns 
against the temptation to consider an intervention as having the same outcome –either 
deterrence or retaliatory- over time: a particular strategy may not only eventually raise or 
lower its influence but, as in this case, have some initial costs but ultimately prove beneficial 
in reducing violence.        
On the other hand, the introduction of the 1978 Law occurs throughout a rising wave of 
terrorist attacks by ETA, whose effect we controlled for in the model through the use of the 
attack density variable as control. In this respect, Clark argues that clearly the new Spanish 
counterinsurgency policy after 1 July,1978did little if anything to restrain ETA violence.
49
 At 
the same time, Jaime-Jiménez has also illustrated how the legislation was accompanied by the 
deployment of security forces to Basque Country that acted in occasions with excessive force 
and in a heavy-handed manner.
50
Reinares has also highlighted in his interviews with former 
ETA militants the strong impact that personal and indirect experience with policy brutality 
during the 1970s had in their decision to join the organisation.
51
 The Law is therefore 
illustrative of a broader policy shift by the government towards a more coercive approach that 
resulted in unconstitutional abuses of human rights.        
At the same time, backlash may develop in subtler ways than simply as a short-term burst of 
attacks following an intervention. There may be deleterious long-term effects that are harder 
for the model to detect. For instance, there is much evidence that the GAL was not only a 
‘major departure from accepted liberal democratic constitutional principles of law and 
order’52but also profoundly counterproductive as it built the perception by a new generation 
of ETA recruits ofan oppressive Spanish state whose methods were no different from Franco. 
These events and the cases of police abuse and intimidation up until the mid-1980s helped to 
legitimise violence for many Basques and provided radicals with a rallying cry. It took years 
of selective and law-abiding counterterrorist practices to counterbalance these negative social 
perceptions. It is far from outlandish to think that the GAL may have contributed to extend 
ETA support for years.As Reinares and Jaime-Jiménez contend: ‘state-sponsored terrorism 
used to counter insurgent terrorism can be considered a major factor explaining why ETA has 
persisted beyond the democratic transition.’53 
It should be noted that, despite the ample benefits that survival analysis models brings to our 
understanding of the effectiveness of specific counter-terror initiatives, there are 
alsolimitations in these approaches.Inevitably, they struggle to separate the effects of 
initiatives that are close in time, they work better at detecting immediate impact than 
identifying subtle,long-lasting outcomes and they do not recognise that the same intervention 
can elicit both short-term increases and long-term decreases of violence and viceversa. 
Furthermore, despite basing our selection of interventions on a careful and extensive review 
of the existing literature and previous research, it is conceivable that variables that are not in 
the model would have been potentially useful.These matters should be taken into 
consideration whenworking with these models rather than analysing the effects and simply 
assuming either deterrence or backlash.They also emphasise the relevance of contextual 
knowledge and subject matter expertise in ensuring an effective research design anda precise 
interpretation of the outputs from these statistical tests.   
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With these disclaimers in mind, we are confident thatourfindings add further empirical 
evidence to the literature on backlash effects. One of our interventions (French extraditions) 
had clear short term negative effects and it is possible to argue that two others (Law 1978 and 
GAL) can be interpreted along those lines. At the same time, a measure (Batasuna’s banning) 
that was forcefully predicted by some to lead to retaliation, failed to reignite political 
violence. All things considered, and in general agreement with LaFree et al’s 2009 study of 
British counterterrorism in Northern Ireland, the evidence in our study suggests that some 
aggressive state responses in the past aggravated conflict levels in Basque Country.  
This offers empirical support to the widely held notion that punitive counter-terror tactics can 
potentially have counterproductive effects.We have also speculated about the possibility that 
some initiatives could havenegative short-term consequences but bring long-term benefits 
while specially damaging actions involving egregious abuses of citizens’ rights may result 
inboth immediate and enduringviolence. The Spanish case, as in Northern Ireland, also 
demonstrates how democratic governments can face much public pressure to adopt harsh 
repressive measures, even if these are also accompanied by constructive political strategies, 
when challenged by substantial levels of political violence within their borders.Yet it also 
provides support to the idea that democraciescan engage ina learning process when fighting 
terrorism, where heavy-handed action may become prevalent in an initial stage 
butprogressive refinement and adjustment can also occur, with the state acting in a more 
discriminateand legitimate manner, thus diminishing the risk of backfires.  
The findings from our study are relevant to the subject of responses to criminal justice 
measures in a context of ethno-nationalist violence.  As a natural extension of this research, a 
valuable approachmay be to adapt this perspective to the study of government responses to 
other types of violence, such as extreme left and right-wing movements or the actions of 
jihadist groups.  Moreover, a greater body of evidence is required regarding the relationship 
between the probability of deterrence or escalation and the organisational characteristics of 
militant groups. Furthermore, and since explanations of backlash effects arepartially 
predicated on variations in recruitment patterns, it would be interesting to examinein more 
depth how changing patterns of violence, especially periods of increased terrorist activity, 
correlate with different indicators of public support for violent organisations (i.e. membership 
in certain political parties) over time. The possibilities are numerous and, regardless of the 
particular research question adopted, it is clear from the above that a judicious application of 
the concepts of deterrence and backlash can open new and fruitful avenues for the study of 


























































































                                                          
1
Sensitivity analysis for the hazard ratio and confidence interval estimates from intervention "Deportations and 
extraditions by France" with a monthly time window increase. Itevaluates whether changes in the period of 
the intervention had an impact in its estimate of the hazard ratio. Models identical to the final model shown in 
Table 2 were fitted varying the duration of the intervention, from one month to 20 years increasing one month 




Table 1. Interventions and Controls included in the study with descriptive information 
Covariates Median (IQR) 
Attacksfrequency 
# attacks on 
previous year 
#  attacks on 
intervention/control 






1 (4) 100 310 78 
GAL  
(17/10/83 – 24/7/87) 
2 (6) 76 310 58 
French deportations 
and extraditions (1 yr) 
(1/1/84 – 1/1/85) 
3 (8) 83 70 82 
French deportations 
and extraditions (3yr) 
(1/1/84 – 1/1/87) 
2 (6) 83 244 59 
Sokoa (1 yr) 
(5/11/86 – 5/11/87) 
3 (6) 90 69 62 
Sokoa (3 yr) 
(5/11/86 – 5/11/89)  
3 (4) 90 229 65 
Bidart (1 yr) 
(29/3/92 – 29/3/93) 
7 (14) 83 29 18 
Bidart(3 yr) 
(29/3/92 – 29/3/95)  
8 (21) 83 73 34 
Batasuna banning  
(1yr) 
(26/8/02 – 26/8/03) 
18 (43) 25 11 5 
Batasuna banning  
(3yr) 
(26/8/02 – 26/8/05) 
16 (38) 25 34 14 
CONTROLS 




2 (3) 167 115 82 
Guernica statute (3yr) 
(15/10/79 – 
15/10/82) 
2 (5) 167 265 79 
Ajuria Enea Pact 
(12/1/88 – 12/9/98) 
3 (8) 57 515 471 
Algiers 
(8/1/89 – 7/4/89) 
0 77 0 104 
Zurich 
(3/11/98 – 28/11/99) 
168 (162) 12 3 44 
Oslo 
(25/6/05 – 21/5/07) 
7 (25.5) 14 24 16 




Density Date of current – date of the second previous event. 
This variable represents the density of attacks.  
 
Table 2.Parameter estimates for the main Series Hazard Model 
Variable Estimate 
 (Standard Error) 
P-value Hazard Ratio  
(95% CL) 
INTERVENTIONS 
1978 Anti-terroristLaw -0.3389 (0.282) 0.23    
GAL -0.133 (0.154) 0.39 0.875 (0.646-1.186) 
French deportations and 
extraditions 
0.2392 (0.081) 0.003 1.27 (1.084-1.488) 
Sokoa 0.079 (0.129) 0.542 1.082 (0.84-1.392) 
Bidart -0.124 (0.192) 0.518 0.883 (0.606-1.287) 
Batasuna banning 0.154 (0.201) 0.443 1.167 (0.787-1.731) 
1978 Anti-terrorist Law 
*Cumulative month 
0.0222 (0.0085) 0.009 0.6912 (0.593-0.805) 
CONTROLS   
Guernica statute -0.018 (0.094) 0.051 0.832 (0.691-1.001) 
1.061 (0.935-1.205) Ajuria Enea Pact 0.0596 (0.064) 0.357 
Algiers -0.07 (0.515) 0.893 0.933 (0.34-2.559) 
Zurich 1.186 (0.829) 0.153 3.275 (0.645-16.64) 
Oslo  0.206 (0.239) 0.389 1.23 (0.77-1.96) 
Cumulative month  -0.00076 (0.00038) 0.03    
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